Administrative Law--Termination of Employment--Reinstatement Held Not Condition Precedent to Suit for Salary Where Plaintiff Shows Clear Legal Right to Position (Austin v. Board of Higher Educ., 5 A.D.2d 664 (1st Dep\u27t 1958)) by St. John\u27s Law Review
St. John's Law Review 
Volume 33 
Number 1 Volume 33, December 1958, Number 
1 
Article 10 
May 2013 
Administrative Law--Termination of Employment--Reinstatement 
Held Not Condition Precedent to Suit for Salary Where Plaintiff 
Shows Clear Legal Right to Position (Austin v. Board of Higher 
Educ., 5 A.D.2d 664 (1st Dep't 1958)) 
St. John's Law Review 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/lawreview 
Recommended Citation 
St. John's Law Review (1958) "Administrative Law--Termination of Employment--Reinstatement Held Not 
Condition Precedent to Suit for Salary Where Plaintiff Shows Clear Legal Right to Position (Austin v. Board 
of Higher Educ., 5 A.D.2d 664 (1st Dep't 1958))," St. John's Law Review: Vol. 33 : No. 1 , Article 10. 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/lawreview/vol33/iss1/10 
This Recent Development in New York Law is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at St. John's 
Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in St. John's Law Review by an authorized editor of 
St. John's Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact selbyc@stjohns.edu. 
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
philosophical, or political objections, and have subsequently been con-
victed for persisting in his principles. Furthermore, recent develop-
ments in the substantive and procedural law in the area might pos-
sibly have effected a result other than conviction. The interpretation
of the requirement of "religious training" as used in the statute has
been liberalized in one district court,28 and the United States Supreme
Court has enlarged the ability of an individual to gain judicial appeal
of Selective Service Board classifications. 2
9
Although the rationale of the Court in arriving at the necessity
of a hearing appears tenuous, the result achieved is equitable. Con-
viction per se can hardly be considered conclusive evidence of un-
trustworthiness in this era of crime without culpability, and evaluation
of conduct would seem the better test in determining an applicant's
character.
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW - TERMINATION OF EMPLOYMENT
REINSTATEMENT HELD NOT CONDITION PRECEDENT TO SUIT FOR
SALARY WHERE PLAINTIFF SHOWS CLEAR LEGAL RIGHT TO
PosITION.-Pursuant to section 903 of the New York City Charter,'
plaintiffs were dismissed from city colleges in 1953 for pleading their
privilege against self-incrimination before a legislative subcommittee.
The United States Supreme Court subsequently held a similar ap-
plication of the charter provision to another city college employee
28 In re Hansen, 148 F. Supp. 187 (D. Minn. 1957), 32 ST. JOHN'S L. REV.
105 (1957).
29 Dickinson v. United States, 346 U.S. 389 (1953); Comment, 50 Nw.
U.L. REv. 660, 668-69 (1955). In Falbo v. United States, 320 U.S. 549 (1944),
the Supreme Court held that defendant was not entitled to review in a criminal
proceeding for violation of the Universal Military Training Law. However,
in Estep v. United States, 327 U.S. 114 (1946), the Court reversed its stand and
assumed a jurisdiction which was subsequently enlarged by the Dickinson case.
1 "If any councilman or other officer or employee of the city shall, after
lawful notice or process, wilfully refuse or fail to appear before any court
or judge, any legislative committee, or any officer, board or body authorized
to conduct any hearing or inquiry, or having appeared shall refuse to testify
or to answer any question regarding the property, government or affairs of
the city or of any county included within its territorial limits, or regarding
the nomination, election, appointment or official conduct of any officer or
employee of the city or of any such county, on the ground that his answer
would tend to incriminate him, or shall refuse to waive immunity from prose-
cution on account of any such matter in relation to which he may be asked to
testify upon any such hearing or inquiry, his term or tenure of office or em-
ployment shall terminate and such office or employment shall be vacant, and
he shall not be eligible to election or appointment to any office or employment
under the city or any agency." N.Y.C. CHARTER § 903.
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unconstitutional. 2  In the present action at law to recover accrued
salary, the Appellate Division, reversing the New York Supreme
Court's dismissal of the complaint, 3 held that plaintiffs had a clear
legal right to reinstatement and therefore actual reinstatement was
not a condition precedent to their action for salary. Austin v. Board
of Higher Educ., 5 A.D.2d 664, 174 N.Y.S.2d 511 (1st Dep't 1958).
The usual procedure in New York for recovering salary from
a municipal corporation is a petition for an order of mandamus to
compel payment, 4 in a proceeding under article 78 of the Civil Prac-
tice Act.5 Where the employee's salary has been withheld, he peti-
tions for its payment.0 Where the employee has been dismissed,
he petitions for both reinstatement and payment of salary accrued.
7
Some cases, however, allow recovery of accrued salary in an action
at law, 8 and some early mandamus petitions were unsuccessful be-
cause an action would lie at law. 9
In the principal case, the Court struck down defendant's con-
tention that plaintiffs had chosen an improper remedy by suing at
law. The defendant first argued that the dismissals of the plaintiffs
were discretionary, and thus reviewable only by an article 78 pro-
ceeding 10 in the nature of certiorari. The Court answered that the
dismissals were non-discretionary because they resulted from the
self-executing provisions of section 903 of the New York City
Charter. The defendant then argued that the complaint was insuffi-
cient for failure to allege reinstatement, which may be obtained only
2 Slochower v. Board of Educ., 350 U.S. 551 (1956).
3 Austin v. Board of Higher Educ., 9 M.2d 253, 170 N.Y.S.2d 7 (Sup.
Ct. 1957).
4 See, e.g., N.Y. Civ. SERV. LAW § 22, repealed April 15, 1958, effective
April 1. 1959, LAWS oF N.Y. 1958, c. 790; Daniman v. Board of Educ., 202
Misc. 915, 118 N.Y.S.2d 487 (Sup. Ct. 1952), aff'd inem. sub mn. Shlakman
v. Board of Higher Educ., 282 App. Div. 718, 122 N.Y.S.2d 286 (2d Dep't
1953), aff'd sub norm. Daniman v. Board of Educ., 306 N.Y. 532, 119 N.E.2d
373 (1954), rev'd sub nom. Slochower v. Board of Educ., 350 U.S. 551 (1956);
22 CARuoDY-WAmT, Nmv YoRK PRAcrxcE 275-76, 293-94 (1956).
r See N.Y. Crv. PRAc. AcT §§ 1283 (which abolishes the form of the writ
of mandamus), 1284(3) (which preserves the substantive remedy of that writ).
0 See, e.g., People ex rel. Churchman v. Board of Trustees, 58 N.Y. 654
(1874); Gelson v. Barry, 233 App. Div. 20, 250 N.Y. Supp. 577 (2d Dep't),
aff'd nem., 257 N.Y. 551, 178 N.E. 791 (1931); Conolly v. Craft, 205 App.
Div. 583, 200 N.Y. Supp. 69 (2d Dep't 1923).
7 See, e.g., Barmonde v. Kaplan, 266 N.Y. 214, 216, 194 N.E. 681 (1935);
Daniman v. Board of Educ., supra note 4; Ironside v. Tead, 13 N.Y.S.2d 17
(Sup. Ct. 1939), modified mzem., 258 App. Div. 940, 17 N.Y.S.2d 994 (1st
Dep't), aff'd nem., 283 N.Y. 667, 28 N.E.2d 399 (1940).
8 See, e.g., Rasmussen v. City of New York, 301 N.Y. 532, 93 N.E.2d 344(1950) ; Toscano v. McGoldrick, 300 N.Y. 156, 89 N.E.2d 873 (1949) ; Steinson
v. Board of Educ., 165 N.Y. 431, 59 N.E. 300 (1901).
9 See, e.g., People ex rel. Harnett v. Inspectors, 44 How. Pr. 322 (Sup.
Ct. N.Y. 1873); People ex rel. Perry v. Thompson, 25 Barb. 73 (Sup. Ct.
N.Y. 1857); Ex parte Lynch, 2 Hill 45 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. 1841).20 N.Y. Civ. PRAc. AcT §§ 1283, 1284(2).
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by an article 78 proceeding " in the nature of mandamus. The
Court answered that reinstatement is not necessary where plaintiff
shows a clear legal right to the position.
By way of deciding that the dismissals were non-discretionary,
the Appellate Division characterizes section 903 as imposing a
"self-executing forfeiture" and emphasizes that "no further action is
required." 12 However, the United States Supreme Court in
Slochower v. Board of Educ.13 indicated that section 903 constitu-
tionally terminates employment only upon proper action by the city
agency. Thus it seems that the Appellate Division urges an uncon-
stitutional construction of the statute by declaring plaintiffs' positions
forfeit as of the time of their refusal to testify. 4 If the statute were
construed so as to save its constitutionality, the Board's decision to
dismiss would have marked the termination of plaintiffs' employment.
Under this construction, the presence or absence of discretion in the
Board's decision would be a question of fact determinative of whether
or not a suit at law was available. A finding to the effect that the
Board's application of the statute's varied requirements to plaintiffs'
acts involved discretion seems possible. With a finding of discretion,
plaintiffs' complaint would be dismissible and their proper remedy a
proceeding 1r to review the Board's judgment.
The Court cites Toscano v. McGoldrick 16 as conclusive author-
ity for the proposition that plaintiffs had a clear legal right to their
positions and thus could recover accrued salary at law. The Toscano
case allowed the unreinstated employee an action at law on the theory
that his dismissal was clearly illegal. The illegality of the dismissal
was shown by a prior New York Court of Appeals decision to the
effect that the statute authorizing the dismissal was illegal. Thus
the Toscano case, while not requiring reinstatement, is consonant with
the over-all view that a definitive recognition of plaintiff's right to
the position is necessary to a law action.17 In the early case of
"1 N.Y. Civ. PRAc. AcT §§ 1283, 1284(3).
12Austin v. Board of Higher Educ., 5 A.D.2d 664, 666, 174 N.Y.S.2d 511,
513 (1st Dep't 1958).
13350 U.S. 551 (1956).
14 It is submitted that the Court should not have construed the statute as
unconstitutional on its face. However, the Board's decision to dismiss might
have been found an unconstitutional exercise of its power to dismiss. For
a constitutional application of the statute, the United States Supreme Court
indicated that the agency's inquiry should consider ". . . the subject matter
of the questions, remoteness of the period to which they are directed, or jus-
tification for the exercise of the privilege . . . .mistake, inadvertence or legal
advice conscientiously given, whether wisely or unwisely." Slochower v. Board
of Educ., 350 U.S. 551, 558 (1956).
15 N.Y. CIv. PRAc. Acr §§ 1283, 1284(2).
16300 N.Y. 156, 89 N.E.2d 873 (1949).
17 Toscano was reinstated without any further action by him after the
decision in Matter of Rushford v. LaGuardia, 280 N.Y. 217, 20 N.E.2d 547
(1939). The Toscano Court said that, since the dismissal had already been
declared illegal, the city was only doing what it had to do in restoring him to
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Thompson v. Board of Educ.18 the Court of Appeals considered rec-
ognition by reinstatement necessary, for they denied the remedy at
law in the absence of reinstatement. Dicta in more recent cases like-
wise indicates that a successful mandamus is a condition precedent of
the action at law.19 In a case where the law action was available, the
facts show that the unreinstated teacher's right to the position had
been recognized administratively by the Superintendent of Schools. 20
In these cases, the clear legal right to the position without which a
plaintiff at law is unsuccessful seems to be a right already defined
by reinstatement, adjudication, or administrative acknowledgment.
Inasmuch as the instant case states that plaintiffs will eventually have
to sustain their right either under the Slochower case or otherwise,21
its finding of a clear legal right to their positions seems to depart
from the Toscano view of a clear legal right, i.e., a right which has
prior official recognition. In the absence of any judicial or adminis-
trative determination of plaintiffs' right, the recognition by reinstate-
ment seems essential. 22
Under precedent, then, the legality of a municipal employee's
dismissal was not litigated in a law action but in a mandamus pro-
ceeding. Under the present ruling, the legality of any dismissal not
involving discretion can be determined at law. While a contract ac-
tion is the logical procedure to determine whether a defendant has
breached a binding promise of employment by dismissing the plain-
tiff,23 the question of a municipality's breach should not be resolved
in this way. The unfair result would follow that an employee seeking
restoration to public service must move against the municipality
within four months of dismissal, while an employee seeking salary
without service need not act for six years.24 The public interest would
his previous position. Thus, it was continued, a mandamus for restoration
would be superfluous.
is201 N.Y. 457, 94 N.E. 1082 (1911).
'9 Barmonde v. Kaplan, 266 N.Y. 214, 216, 194 N.E. 681 (1935) ; Thoma v.
City of New York, 263 N.Y. 402, 407, 189 N.E. 470, 472 (1934).
20 Steinson v. Board of Educ., 49 App. Div. 143, 146, 63 N.Y. Supp. 128,
130 (1st Dep't 1900), aff'd, 165 N.Y. 431, 59 N.E. 300 (1901). It should be
noted that it was not the Superintendent of Schools who recognized the plain-
tiff's right to the teaching position, but rather the defendant Board of Educa-
tion that dismissed the plaintiff.
21Austin v. Board of Higher Educ., 5 A.D.2d 664, 668, 174 N.Y.S.2d
511, 515 (1st Dep't 1958).
22 The Court in the principal case considers Toscano's reinstatement in-
operative as to his right to salary. The reinstatement is indeed inoperative as
creating the right to the position, for that right had already been created by
the Rushford decision. Where the clear legal right has already been created,
as in the Toscano case, its recognition by reinstatement is not essential. Thus,
as the Austin Court reasons, Toscano's reinstatement was inoperative to deter-
mine his right to the salary. But, under the facts of the present case where
the very existence of the right is in question, its recognition by reinstatement
seems essential in finding a clear legal right.
23 5 WILiST N, CONuTCTS § 1288 (rev. ed. 1937).
24 Compare N.Y. CRv. PRAC. ACT § 1286 (which allows a four-month period
1958 ]
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seem to be harmed by a six-year statute of limitations in determining
municipal liability.
ADVERTISING-FALSE IMPRESSION HELD ACTIONABLE.-Defen-
dant corporation had advertised toys for sale at large discounts.
Nevertheless it sold two games at a "discounted" price greater than
the standard retail rate established in the community. In affirming
a conviction for deceptive advertising,' the Court of Appeals held
that though the defendant might set its list prices and discounts
freely, it might not create the false impression that it was underselling
its competitors. People v. Minjac Corp., 4 N.Y.2d 320, 151 N.E.2d
180, 175 N.Y.S.2d 16 (1958).
At common law the merchant's practice of making exalted claims
for his wares was not actionable if the parties dealt at arm's length.2
But when the expansion of business gave rise to mass advertising,
exaggeration to the point of falsehood became so common that some
regulation was badly needed. The only existing remedy made suc-
cessful prosecution all but impossible because it entailed proving all
three requirements of a deceit action, i.e., intentional falsification,
reliance, and resulting harm.3 In 1911 the trade magazine Printer's
Ink proposed a Model Statute 4 designed to curb advertising abuses.
This statute did not require knowledge of falsity, intent to deceive,
or damage to a purchaser, but rather imposed absolute liability on
anyone guilty of the prohibited act.5 At present only five states have
not adopted this Model Statute in a general way; 6 eleven have added
the requirement of knowledge of falsity.7
for filing a petition in an article 78 proceeding in certiorari or mandamus),
with N.Y. CIv. PRAc. AcT §48(1) (which allows a six-year period for the
commencement of a contract action).
1 "Any . . . corporation . . . [which], with [the] intent to sell or in any
wise dispose of merchandise . . .. directly or indirectly, to the public ....
makes, publishes, . . . or places before the public . . . in the form of a . . .
poster, bill, sign, placard, card . . . an advertisement [which] . . . contains any
assertion, representation or statement of fact which is untrue, deceptive or
misleading, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor." N.Y. PEN. LAW § 421 (Supp.
1958).
2 See, e.g., Burwash v. Ballou, 230 Ill. 34, 82 N.E. 355 (1907).
3 See RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 525, at 59 (1938).
4 See Comment, 36 YALE L.J. 1155, 1156 n.6 (1927).5 Id. at 1157.
6 Arkansas, Delaware, Georgia, Mississippi, and New Mexico. See Note,
56 COLUm. L. REv. 1018, 1058 (1956).
7 CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE ANN. § 17500 (West 1956); FLA. STAT. ANN.§ 817.06 (1941); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 195 (1957); MAss. ANN. LAws
c. 266, §91 (1956); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. 580:9 (1955); PA. STAT. ANN.
